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Tbilisi radar, destroyed by a Russian missile 
 
In Georgia, attention now turns towards sorting out the impact of the short August conflict. How 
plausible is the reporting we are seeing? Do the journalists get it right? 
 
Here's one account by the New York Times, outlining some of the damage and the upcoming 
challenges. 
 
 
Click here for the complete article (access is free, but it will require you to register; we can make the 
article available to you directly as well). 
 
Posted on an e-mail newsgroup focusing on Georgia, this NYT article quickly drew a response. Here 
is what (Dr.) George Welton, a consultant we have worked with extensively and who has done 
various research projects in Georgia, had to say: 
 
----------------------- 
"This is sufficiently fishy to warrant comment. First, ‘Caucasian Tiger’ gimme a break. As far as I 
could tell before the war the economy was vastly overheating with an inflated property market and a 
banking sector expanding way too fast (is there any other city in the world with this many ATMs?) 
But more importantly, Georgia was still not really producing anything that the world wanted to buy. 
Two of its largest exports – manganese and copper – have increased their revenues dramatically 
largely because of the price of resources going up on world markets and agriculture has still not 
recovered from the Russian market closing (wine is now exporting at about 40% its pre-ban levels – 
not allowing for inflation). But now everything wrong with the Georgian economy is going to be 
blamed on the war. 
 
That said, I think that the war damage melodrama is vastly unhelpful. 
 
1/ I don’t really buy this claim of $50 million repair costs for Caucasus Online. Can anyone verify 
this happened? I know people who were emailing, texting and skyping throughout the war – and 
there are lots of reasons why a business might want to exaggerate its losses. I have a feeling a lot of 
Georgian businesses might find they had things hit by the Russians in coming weeks. 
 
2/ The tourist season has been damaged but ‘Russian tourists?!’. The Armenian tourists (who have 
to be the vast majority of the Georgian tourist market) will be back next year. 
 
3/ There is no evidence that the fire outside of Borjomi National Park was started with incendiary 
bombs. The 950 hectares (just under 10 square kilometres) was almost entirely outside the park (the 
revised Gvt figures put 150 hectares in the park) and even if it had all been in the park, this is only 
slightly more than 1%. Borjomi did not ‘burn’. 
 
4/ The idea that the Russians targeted infrastructure or that they might in the future is completely 
unsupported by the evidence. One train bridge (right next to another train bridge which almost 
immediately replaced it) was destroyed. None of the key infrastructure (Inguri dam, the BTC 
pipeline, the ports etc) were damaged significantly. 
 
5/ The banking system survived without banks closing their doors for a significant time and in spite 
of the fact that there was a war. This is remarkable and while I am sure it will continue to need 
support, I think this should be seen as a sign of the strength of the Georgian economy, not its 
weakness. 
 
6/ One billion infrastructure losses?!? – I guess he must be talking about the military (which still 
seems a little implausible) 
 
The reason why this matters is that where the article is right is that the key damage to this country is 
investor confidence. Foreign aid might get the Georgian budget through the next two years or so – 
but after that if investors don’t start to come back then the country is really in trouble. And talking 
about the horrendous damage and huge risks that Russia poses to the country are not going to help 
that confidence return. 
 
